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The company mentioned in this case study is fictional. This case study was developed exclusively for 
the purpose of class discussion. It is not intended to serve as endorsements, source of primary data, or 
illustrations of effective or ineffective handling of the investment situation. 
 
Financing the Alentejo Solar Plant 
General Overview 
This document presents a Case Study of financing a solar power plant under a project finance scheme, 
allowing students to negotiate the loan proposal outside of class. On one side of the negotiating table 
students can assume the role of the project’s manager, Ana Luz, and on the other the role of the lender, 
represented by its head of project finance Carlos Abrantes. The Case is divided in three parts: one 
common narrative and two independent sub-narratives to be assumed respectively by different groups 
of students. Each sub-narrative includes a set of confidential information that will be useful in a 
subsequent negotiation process among students. The last section of this document provides a Teaching 
Note presenting a summary of the case description and guideline for the negotiation exercise to be 
completed before class. In addition, a suggested roadmap for class discussion as well as a set of questions 
is presented in the Teaching Note. An Excel file with the Financial Model is attached to this document 
to support the simulation of the negotiations. 
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Financing the Alentejo Solar Power Plant (A) 
In her Lisbon office in December 2014, Ana Luz, project manager at Sun Ventures, was about to receive 
an email from Carlos Abrantes, head of project finance at Banco Lusitano de Investimento (BLI). The 
email would present BLI’s proposed term sheet for funding the development and construction costs of 
a solar power plant located in Alentejo – the Solentejo project. Assuming that BLI sends a proposal 
which warrants further discussion, Ana will schedule a second meeting with Carlos for face-to-face 
negotiations. 
Background 
Ana Luz was seeking financing for a 20 megawatt (MW) solar plant located in the Alentejo region of 
Portugal. In their first meeting at Sun Ventures headquarters, Ana presented the initiative, explaining its 
scope and the contractual structure, as well as the financial model with the expected drivers of return 
and funding needs. On the other side of the table, Carlos gave an overview of the relevant financial 
market conditions and debt structuring issues underlying the project finance scheme for solar projects. 
At the end, after both having exchanged first impressions and clarified some doubts, Carlos concluded: 
Thank you for inviting us to analyze this opportunity. Over the next couple of days, my team 
and I are going to make a preliminary valuation of the financial feasibility of this project and 
we will prepare a preliminary loan term sheet to email you, as soon as possible. In the 
meanwhile, don’t hesitate to contact us in case you have further questions. 
The Solar Project 
In 2012, Sun Ventures purchased a license of 20 MW from a competitor. This license originally granted 
by the Portuguese Government, qualifies the licensee to connect solar plants to the Portuguese electric 
grid under a long term power purchase agreement (PPA)1. Since then, Ana Luz has started the project 
development process: securing appropriate land, going through the construction licensing process and 
defining the contractual structure, including the procurement of the EPC (Engineering, Procurement and 
Construction) and the O&M (Operation and Maintenance) contractors. 
Site Selection 
The solar plant will be located in Alentejo region, close to the border with Spain (see Exhibit 1). Known 
as one of the sunniest places in Portugal and in Europe, Alentejo has an average Direct Normal 
                                                     
1 This PPA was launched through a competitive public solar auction by the Portuguese State in 2010. Participants in this auction 
submitted a bid with a price per unit of electricity at which they were able to implement the project. Then, the government 
evaluated the offers on the basis of the price and other criteria and signed a power purchasing agreement with the bidder that 
submitted the highest price per unit of electricity.    
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Irradiation (DNI)2 of 2,000 kwh/sqm per year, making it a natural choice for the site of a solar plant with 
a single-axis tracking system3. 
The land selection had been constrained by the need to avoid protected or agricultural areas, since it is 
located in the main agricultural region of Portugal. After a long search process, including more than 15 
visits to different potential places4 and a few rounds of negotiations with landowners, Ana signed a 
promissory contract5 with one local farmer in exchange for an annual rent of Eur 1,200 per hectare (ha), 
indexed to inflation, for an available area of 76 ha. This contract will take the form of 25 years surface 
right agreements starting at construction and includes the option to increase the contract duration by at 
least 5 years up to 30 years. 
Licensing process 
Once the land was secured, Ana initiated the licensing procedure simultaneously with the Directorate 
General for Energy and Geology (DGEG) and the Portuguese electricity distribution network operator 
(EDP). From DGEG Ana obtained the ‘Production License’ – the authorization for the production of 
electrical energy – and received the ‘Grid Reception point’ from EDP – the document disclosing the 
point where the power produced by the solar plant is going to be injected in the national electrical grid. 
Then, the licensing was arranged at the municipal level and at the central level (Ministry of 
Environment), upon which the project was subject to an environmental impact assessment, namely 
whether it was located in protected or agricultural areas. Once this assessment was completed, Ana 
obtained a construction permit from the Alentejo Municipality. After a long and time-consuming 
bureaucratic process, Ana finally got the required licenses to start construction of the solar plant. 
Contractual Structure 
To take on the project, Ana Luz set up Solentejo, Lda (Solentejo) as a separately incorporated special-
purpose vehicle, which then contracted with various counterparties for the different services required to 
get the project off the ground. The key players in the structure were: 
 The Sponsor: Sun Ventures has been the only sponsor who has funded the license purchase and all 
the development costs up-front for the time being as equity. 
 EPC contractor: EPC was subcontracted to BuildSun, a Sun Ventures’s sister company, to design 
and construct the solar plant and its associated infrastructure, as well as commissioning under a 
                                                     
2 DNI corresponds to the amount of solar radiation received per unit area by a surface that is always held perpendicular to the 
rays that come in a straight line from the sun at its current position in the sky. 
3 Solar tracker systems follow the sun throughout the day to minimize the angle of incidence between the incoming sun rays 
and a photovoltaic panel in order to maximize energy output. 
4 The distance to electricity grid access point (substation) and the slope of the land surface were additional criteria taken into 
consideration by Ana Luz in the search for potential places to establish the solar plant. 
5 The first stage in buying a property in Portugal is usually the signing of a promissory contract (in Portuguese: contrato de 
promessa de compra e venda), which sets out the details of the contract such as the identity of the owner, a detailed description 
of the property and land boundaries, registration and tax numbers, purchase price, deposit and date of the final sale by public 
deed (in Portuguese: escritura pública). 
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fixed time and a fixed price contract. BuildSun mastered the required expertise to build and operate 
solar plants (engineering design, integration/installation, operations) and was composed by a 
qualified team with 10 years of experience in solar studies. Solar modules and the remaining 
required components are going to be supplied and guaranteed by First Solar, BuildSun’s long-
standing supplier partner, who has a proven technology with over 10 gigawatts (GW) installed 
worldwide (Exhibit 2 includes a brief description of First Solar and its technology). The resulting 




















of 15% of 
the price. 
2% of the Price for 
each 1% shortfall of 
the PR for the first 





10% at contract signature. 
75% split in 3 milestones 
during construction. 
5% Provisional acceptance10 
10% Final acceptance11. 
 O&M contractor: O&M was subcontracted to BuildSun Ventures, a joint venture between Sun 
Ventures (65%) and BuildSun (35%), which would assume full operation and maintenance 
services12 with a set of specific guarantees to ensure i) a 99% annual availability13 and ii) penalties 
to compensate for the profit losses. This contract was signed for an initial period of 10 years with 
automatic yearly renewals until year 20 under the same terms and conditions, but subject to the 
approval of financing institutions. 
 Energias de Portugal (EDP): EDP, the Portuguese electricity operator holding an exclusive 
concession granted by the Portuguese State, will be responsible for paying the energy injected by 
Solentejo into the national grid14. 
                                                     
6 A performance bond guarantees a full and successful implementation of the contract according to pre-specified performance 
guidelines. 
7 The Liquidated Damages covers potential costs of construction delays or performance shortfalls, including debt service to 
bond holders. 
8 The performance ratio (PR) is a measure of the quality of a photovoltaic plant, independent of location. The PR is stated as a 
percentage and describes the relationship between the actual and theoretical energy outputs of the PV plant. It thus shows the 
proportion of the energy that is actually available to export to the grid after the deduction of energy loss (e.g. due to thermal 
losses and conduction losses) and of energy consumption for operation. 
9 A test of the project’s ability to perform as planned and generates the expected cash flows. 
10 Document issued by an independent engineer after the first phase of plant testing (commissioning) certifying that pre-
established minimum performance standards have been met. 
11 Document issued by an independent engineer when initial plant testing (commissioning) is complete. Once the final 
acceptance certificate is issued, the SPV takes charge of the plant. 
12 The O&M terms and conditions include a long-term involvement and responsibility of contractor for full O&M services 
including: preventive maintenance; supply and installation of spare parts; corrective maintenance; operation of the plant; 
cleaning of the plant; preventive and corrective maintenance of the civil works and fences; grass cutting; system-monitoring 
and reporting; technical report elaboration; and security and surveillance services. 
13 The availability of the installation is measured as the time during which it is ready to operate when the radiation conditions 
are adequate for it to operate. 
14 According to the rating agencies reports, EDP has a stable outlook due to its relevance in the Portuguese electricity market 
and a low risk profile: S&P: BB+; Moody’s: Baa3; Fitch: BBB-. Source: EDP. Rating de Crédito. 
http://www.edp.pt/pt/investidores/financiamento/rating/ (accessed April 26, 2015). 
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Operation of the solar plant 
Expected to be operational by January 2016, the solar plant will be able to generate up to 38,400 MWh 
per year15 (based on a P50 scenario16) sufficient to power an average of 19,840 households and to 
displace an estimated 33,234 metric tons of carbon dioxide over the next 25 years. Notice that this power 
generation may decline over the course of time, due to the degradation of the thin-film solar modules17. 
Due to the 20 MW license, Solentejo benefits from a PPA with a feed-in tariff (FiT) of 148 Eur/MWh 
(2014 prices), indexed to inflation, applicable to the first 22 GWh per installed MW (or 440,000 MWh) 
delivered to the grid and subject to a limit of 15 years. 
The operating costs refer mainly to the property lease and to the O&M contract set with BuildSun 
Ventures, in which a fixed annual price of Eur 135,744 was established for the first five years, followed 
by a fixed annual price of Eur 187,872 from that moment onwards, indexed to inflation. 
Financing the project 
The Solar plant’s total capital requirements were budgeted to be Eur 42.8 million. So far, Sun Ventures, 
as part of its equity commitment, has financed Eur 14.2 million upon the 20 MW license purchase18. 
Ana Luz is now seeking to fulfill the remaining Eur 28.6 million with debt in order to finance the EPC 
contract (Eur 25.2 million) and the development fees (Eur 3.4 million)19.  
Background of Sun Ventures 
History 
Sun Ventures was set up in 2007 as a renewable energy company focused on the development of solar 
powered projects. The company, headquartered in Lisbon, became successfully positioned in the Iberian 
Peninsula solar sector and three years later, in 2010, it was acquired by the Green Partners Group, an 
investment fund with a strong focus on the renewable energy sector. This acquisition allowed Green 
Partners Group to strategically expand its business to the solar sector, which until then had only been 
                                                     
15 38,400 MWh per year is calculated considering an average DNI of 2,000 kwh/m2, PR of 80%, output capacity of 20 MW 
and conversion factor of 1.2 (2,000 x 80% x 20 x 1.2 = 38,400 MWh per year). The PR's estimate was based on the value stated 
in the O&M contract and the conversion factor corresponds to the capacity of the solar inverter to be installed under the First 
Solar’s supply contract. The inverter converts the variable direct current (DC) output of a solar panel into a frequency 
alternating current (AC) that can be fed into the Portuguese commercial electrical grid. 
16 The P50 scenario corresponds to the average level of annual solar-driven electricity generation that it is forecasted to be 
exceeded 50% of the year. This is the scenario generally considered for the sponsors’ Base Case. Concerning banks, they 
usually follow a more conservative approach with a bank case based on a P90 scenario, corresponding in this project to 
32,256 MWh per year. 
17 The financial model considers a degradation rate of 0.6% per year. However, the estimated range for degradation rates for 
thin-film panel technologies generally lies between 0.3% and 1.0%. The warranty provided by First Solar guarantees an annual 
degradation threshold of up to 1% in output during 20 years. Financially speaking, degradation of a panel is very important, 
because a higher degradation rate translates directly into less power produced and, therefore, reduces future cash flows. 
18 The purchase of this license was fully co-funded by the Green Partners Group – Sun Ventures’s parent company. 
19 The development fees (170,000 Eur/MW) are directly paid to Sun Ventures. 
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focusing in hydropower and wind projects. For Sun Ventures, this marked an important step by greatly 
strengthening its financial capacity, a key factor to invest in projects and to speed up development. 
Recent performance 
From 2007 to 2013, Sun Ventures connected 6 photovoltaic (PV) technology plants to the grid, for a 
total installed capacity of 14 MW of power installed. In 2011, the company sold 2 solar farms with 
2 MW each to a private fund. Nowadays, the company owns an operating portfolio of 10 MW, is 
constructing a new solar plant with an installed capacity of 5 MW (in the South of Spain) and has the 
current 20 MW solar plant under development in the Alentejo region of Portugal.  
Sun Ventures’s turnover is essentially driven by the electricity sales of its project companies and the 
services rendered from its operation and maintenance contracts. Exhibit 3 includes simplified financial 
statements of Sun Ventures. 
Background of Banco Lusitano de Investimento  
History 
Banco Lusitano de Investimento is a Portuguese investment bank founded in 1999 as the investment 
banking arm of the leading local commercial bank Banco Lusitano. This business started in Portugal, 
but it soon began to expand to Spain, Brazil and Portuguese-speaking African countries. 
Throughout its history, the major business line of Banco Lusitano de Investimento was the advisory 
field. The bank sought to have a broad experience in all segments of the financial advisory services 
industry and to build a wide reputation – the second best investment bank in 2013 according to the 
Portuguese League Table20. Its strategy was always driven by an ambition to create long-term value 
investments. In Portugal, the bank gained a strong prominence serving clients in the Financial sector, in 
the Government sector (involving roads and hospitals) and, recently, in the Renewable Energy sector. 
The project finance segment 
The Banco Lusitano Group offers its clients a convenient one-stop-shop solution by combining the roles 
of advisory as well as arranger and ultimate lender of the deal. On the one hand, Banco Lusitano de 
Investimento provides consultancy services for advisory support during the initial phases of structuring 
a deal. On the other hand, Banco Lusitano provides arranging and lending services (the financial 
intermediation), which consist of granting the funds needed for the project based on the feasibility 
studies prepared (Exhibit 4 shows the main type of activities offered for each of the two services 
categories: banking advisory and lending). Furthermore, this integration model is widespread across 
                                                     
20 The reputation of an investment bank is usually assessed through the number of deals advised and the total amount of funds 
raised by each deal. 
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European banking groups, since it provides more cost-competitive solutions21 – especially advantageous 
for smaller projects22, in which cash flows generated during the life of the deal may not be sufficient to 
absorb structuring costs. 
The Portuguese green economy in the European context 
The energy challenge is one of the greatest tests faced by Europe today. Rising energy prices 
and increasing dependence on energy imports jeopardize our security and our 
competitiveness. Key decisions have to be taken to reduce drastically our GHG (GreenHouse 
Gases) emissions and fight climate change. Thankfully, the 2020 strategy provides a solid and 
ambitious European framework for energy policy. 
Günther H. Oettinger, 
European Commissioner for Energy (2011) 
In line with the objective underlying the Europe Strategy 202023, the Portuguese Government presented, 
in July 2010, the National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP), committing Portugal to ambitious 
targets and reforms for the share of renewable energy sources. Portugal undertook to reach, by 2020, the 
target of 31%24 of energy obtained from renewable sources in the total amount of energy consumed 
(Exhibit 5 shows the evolution of the share of renewable energy sources between 2005 and 2013, as 
well as a decreasing external dependence). Furthermore, the Government was also engaged in increasing 
energy efficiency and reducing GHG emissions in order to achieve the targets of the European policies 
and its own national policy commitments. 
Portugal’s energy policy options in terms of electricity production give priority of dispatch to renewable 
energy sources over conventional fossil fuel sources, both in the right to sell the electricity to the national 
grid and in the licensing processes. Moreover, over the course of recent years, Portugal has created a 
series of financial and fiscal measures to support investment in renewable energy. Some of these 
measures have resulted in the creation of differentiated tariffs for electricity produced in renewable 
plants – feed-in tariffs (FiTs) – according to the degree of maturity of the various technologies available 
in the national market. 
In Portugal and in other EU members states, the production of electricity from renewable energy sources, 
such as wind and solar, has been mainly promoted through FiTs (Exhibit 6 compares the average tariffs 
for wind and solar PV, the ones with higher growth in recent years, in the EU-27 in 2011 with their 
                                                     
21 With a clear-cut division of the roles services, there are always additional costs concerning the transaction of roles from 
advisory to that of arranger. Expenses arise when the arranger requires further opinions on specific issues of the legal, fiscal, 
technical, and administrative documentation before making contact with lenders. In addition, there is an independent and 
specific fee structure to remunerate both roles, which is usually higher than the single fee structure of the integrated model. 
22 For the Portuguese project financing market, Banco Lusitano de Investimento considers that a small sized project has a 
financing requirement below Eur 10 M, while a medium sized project has a financing requirement in the range Eur 10 – 40 M. 
23 By 2020, the EU aims to reduce its GHG emissions by 20%, increase the share of renewable energy to at least 20% of 
consumption, and achieve energy savings of 20% or more. 
24 NREAP. March 2011. “Portugal 2020: National Reform Programme,” approved by the Council of Ministers 20 March 2011, 
Chapter 5 - Sustainable Growth. 
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long-term marginal generation costs). Although these tariffs enabled the deployment of renewables, in 
many cases the support systems have proven to be very costly (Exhibit 7 shows the levelized cost of 
energy of wind and solar PV in Euros per MWh in Portugal in 2014). At the same time, it has been 
difficult for regulatory authorities to raise tariffs and prices which would cover those costs. 
Consequently, since the tariffs for the regulated retail electricity price are set below the corresponding 
costs borne by the energy companies, electricity tariff deficits have emerged in some countries. Portugal 
is one of them, where the tariffs paid by EDP to renewable producers are higher than the regulated 
consumer tariffs established by ERSE25. Having already high user tariffs, the resulting financial burden 
has been borne by EDP. At the end of 2013, the total accumulated tariff deficit of EDP estimated by 
ERSE was Eur 3.7 billion (2.2% of Portugal’s GDP)26. In this regard, measures have already been taken 
by the Portuguese Government to address the electricity tariff deficit and to mitigate it until 202027. 
In the third quarter of 2014, the Portuguese wholesale electricity market was, along with the Spanish 
market, among the most expensive ones in the EU (see Exhibit 8). The average quarterly base load price 
in these markets were above 52 Eur/MWh28. 
The promise of the Portuguese Solar sector 
After a first wave of hydro energy and a second one of wind energy promotion, the new source of 
renewable development in Portugal has been via solar energy (Exhibit 9 and Exhibit 10 show the 
evolution of the Portuguese renewable installed capacity in MW and annual production in GWh per 
technology between 2006 and 2014). Currently, as of 2014, Portugal has an installed solar PV capacity 
of 421 MW and by 2020 it is expected to have a cumulative installed capacity of 1,000 MW, according 
to the target set by the Portuguese NREAP (see Exhibit 11). From another point of view, the Portuguese 
Renewable Energy Association’s analysis estimated that the PV installed capacity could be much higher 
and reach 2,000 MW by 2020: 
We believe that the 1,000 MW estimative is clearly lower when it is compared with the expected 
‘boom’ for the solar PV technologies deployment, driven by decreasing PV technology costs 
and the increasing PV cell efficiency. There is also a complete omission of the potential to 
develop solar plants with 5-10 MW capacity close to large consumer centers.29 
For a sunny country like Portugal30 and with no local fossil fuel deposits, investing in solar energy offers 
the potential to address national concerns over energy dependence on imported fuels – which represent 
                                                     
25 The Portuguese Energy Services Regulatory Authority. 
26 European Commission. “Electricity Tariff Deficit: Temporary or Permanent Problem in the EU?,” October 2014, 30 -32. 
27 International Monetary Fund. “Portugal: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding,” March 28, 2014. 
28 European Commission. “Quarterly report on European Electricity Markets,” September 2014, 12. 
29 Adapted from: APREN. “Comentários da APREN à versão final do plano nacional de acção para as energias renováveis,” 
March 2010, 3 (document in Portuguese). 
30 Portugal is one of the Europe’s countries with most solar energy exposure, with an average DNI between 1,600 and 2,100 
kWh/sqm per year. 
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a big part of Portugal’s external imbalances, contributing to a record high current account deficit of 
9.7% of GDP in 2008. The energy trade deficit of EUR 6,232 million in 2013 still amounted to -3.7% 
of GDP, though down from -4.6% a few years earlier (as depicted in Exhibit 12). Reducing energy 
imports is seen as key to achieve the sustained current account surpluses necessary to repay Portugal’s 
considerable external debt. 
Global Project Finance deals 
The world of project finance that funds vital infrastructures has been hardly booming. The problem is 
that the financial crisis has been followed by a bank retrenchment from the field, without non-bank 
institutions filling the finance gap31. The weight of banking can be gauged by its share in global project 
finance (see Exhibit 13). In that context, infrastructure financing by banks has been curtailed as part of 
a bank deleveraging process which is still in course – prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
September 2008, bank loans comprised around 75% of the project finance deals, whereas since then the 
weight of bank loans has decreased to an average of 65%. This is particularly the case for Portuguese 
and European banks, which had traditionally played a significant international role in infrastructure 
financing prior to the global financial crisis. Their balance-sheet repair and capital-ratio adjustment after 
the onset of the euro-zone crisis have been achieved mainly by retrenchment on the asset side of their 
balance sheets, by unwinding existing positions and shunning new commitments (see Exhibit 14). Such 
propensity to retrench has been widespread among banks in crisis-afflicted countries, given the higher 
levels of balance-sheet risk aversion. Remaining uncertainties about the economic recovery, coupled 
with prospective regulatory changes (e.g. Basel III) penalizing liquidity and maturity mismatches in 
deposit-taking institutions, have led banks to reduce leverage, to shorten finance terms, and to raise 
counterparty credit requirements across the board. 
The “perfect storm” of increased capital requirements under the Basel III regulations, banking 
downgrades and Eurozone instability have increased the underlying cost of bank lending, especially for 
the long term. Recent bank rating downgrades reflect the risks now priced into the banking sector, 
particularly those exposed to the riskier end of European Government debt. Basel III requires banks to 
hold more equity capital and capital for long-term loans, increasing the cost of long-term funding, and 
therefore limiting the credit availability and increasing the pricing of long-term debt32. Despite these 
margin increases, long-term project finance is currently still available and affordable due to falling 
Euribor rates (see Exhibit 15 for the evolution of the Euribor 12 month rate on last day of each year 
from 2005 to 2014). 
  
                                                     
31 Non-bank institutions are pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and sovereign wealth funds for example. 
32 With Basel III fully implemented by 2019, it is likely that there will be further impacts on costs of bank funding from this 
legislation in the upcoming years and therefore additional increases in margins and reduced availability of long-term bank debt. 
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Some figures about asset financing in the renewable energy sector33 
In the renewable sector there are different ways of asset financing: (i) on-balance-sheet financing of 
projects by utilities, independent power producers and developers; (ii) non-recourse project finance 
involving a mixture of bank debt and equity; and (iii) other options such as leasing or bond financing. 
For the first time since 2011, there was an increase in 2014 in the value of utility-scale renewable energy 
– projects larger than 1 MW. The global asset financing jumped 10% from 2013 levels, to $170.7 billion, 
but still below the peak of $181.2 billion reached in 2011. In 2014, on-balance-sheet financing made up 
68% of the total, at $116.3 billion – up from the previous year’s $112 billion, but four percentage points 
smaller as a proportion of the total –, while non-recourse project finance made up a little less than 32% 
of the total, at $53.9 billion – up from $42 billion and 28% in 2013 (Exhibit 16 shows the global 
renewable energy asset finance by type of security). 
In 2014, China was the world’s largest renewable energy asset finance market, followed by Europe and 
by the US. Compared to the previous year, China was up 23% to $73 billion, Europe was up 15% to 
$36.2 billion – but still significantly below the annual figures attained during the 2007-12 period –, 
while the US was down 25%, amounting to $15.5 billion (see Exhibit 17). 
A breakdown of 2014’s global activity among different technology groups (as shown in Exhibit 18) 
reveals that both wind and solar energy had an increase in asset finance commitments in comparison 
with the previous year. Wind was up 10% to $92.4 billion and solar was up 15% to $62.8 billion. 
Preparing to negotiate 
After the first meeting with Carlos, Ana learned of the standardized procedures creditors use when 
assessing the credit worthiness and bankability of an initial project financing proposal. As Ana awaits 
the email from BLI, she remembers the project financing pre-requisites Carlos mentioned, which are 
most likely to become the center of discussion in the forthcoming negotiation, as well as his concerns 
about financing on a limited recourse basis, namely: 
i. Sustainable economics: a clearly identifiable demand for the Project’s outputs of goods or services 
is essential in order to justify the investment and the credit. As a general rule, project finance lenders 
will not lend money unless there is a stable projected revenue stream and net operational cash flow 
that can be dedicated entirely for purposes of ensuring repayment of the loans. 
ii. Identifiable risks: during the Project’s economic life, there are, at least, three phases characterized 
by distinct risk profiles: the development phase, the construction phase and the operating phase 
once the project is launched. An unidentified and unmitigated risk in each of these phases could 
potentially jeopardize the stability of the project. Very often, this risk analysis is combined with a 
more quantitative analysis to test the project’s robustness to adverse changes in the key drivers that 
determine operating cash flows. 
                                                     
33 Figures retrieved from Bloomberg New Energy Financing. “Global trends in renewable energy investment,” 2015, 50-57. 
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iii. Political, legal and regulatory environment: the long-term importance of the project to the country, 
the stability of the legal and regulatory system (i.e., the risk of a potential change in law), the 
availability of permits and their approval by the local government, as well as the enforceability of 
contracts and guarantees are vital factors for many project finance transactions taking place. 
iv. Strength of sponsors: the sponsors’ track record of execution of similar transactions is evaluated as 
well as the experience in the respective business sectors, along with financial strength, contribution 
of equity and stand-by equity that might be added in the form of equity or mezzanine finance. 
If these elements above are in line with the bank expectations, Ana believes there is common ground to 
define an acceptable risk profile for the deal, including the proposed leverage, debt size and repayment 
schedule making the project bankable. Additionally, she also knows that upon meeting these first pre-
conditions there will be further discussion on how project lenders will impose operational restrictions, 
such as the ability to make equity distributions only after the payment of operating expenses, debt service 
and the requirement to “sweep”34 a percentage of additional cash flow for debt repayment. 
If Ana and Carlos reach an agreement on the arranging mandate under agreed terms and conditions, then 
BLI will start working on the information memorandum to be presented to other potential lenders and 
begin negotiations on credit agreement and loan documentation.  
At the end of the day, the decision whether to reinvest project cash flows will not be in the hands of Sun 
Ventures, since it will require the lenders’ consent. However, among the available financing solutions, 
Ana believes the project finance scheme is the most appropriate and widely used in renewable energy 
projects. Nonetheless, she knows project financing is document-intensive, time-consuming and 
expensive to consummate, requiring the involvement of a team of advisors from different areas of 
expertise concerning the legal, technical and insurance aspects35. 
In addition, banks often take different views of the project risks than the sponsors, resulting in the bank’s 
base case, and that is reflected in the terms and conditions they include in their financing proposal. 
Furthermore, since Sun Ventures has never dealt with Banco Lusitano de Investimento before, Ana is 
wondering whether Carlos and the bank’s Credit Committee have a positive perspective of the Solentejo 
project on which Ana and the sponsor have been working so hard for so long. 
While Ana is sitting in her office wondering about all the terms and conditions that could be embedded 
in the bank’s term sheet, as well as counter offers with which she might respond, a sound from her 
smartphone disturbs her thoughts and from the screen she can see a new incoming email from Carlos 
with the subject “Proposed loan term sheet for Solentejo solar plant”...  
                                                     
34 Sweep is a covenant that requires all or a specified fraction of available cash flow to be used for debt service, including 
prepayments of principal. 
35 It is not atypical that advisories, lenders, consultants and attorneys’ fees for all parties equal several percentage points of the 
amount of the loan commitment. 
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Exhibit 1: Annual sum of Direct Normal Irradiation (kWh/sqm), average from 1994 to 2010. 
Source: SolarGIS. Maps of Direct normal irradiation. http://solargis.info/doc/free-solar-radiation-maps-DNI 
(accessed April 24, 2015). 
 
Exhibit 2: First Solar’s thin-film technology 
2.1 Company description 
First Solar is an American company, a leader in the development and manufacture of solar modules. 
The company, founded in 1999, has its headquarters in Phoenix (Arizona) and has been quoting on the 
Nasdaq Stock Exchange from November 2006. 
Source: First Solar. http://www.firstsolar.com/en (accessed April 24, 2015). 
 
2.2 Inside a photovoltaic cell 
 
 




 Light shining onto a semiconductor such as silicon 
(Si) generates electron-hole pairs. 
 Electron-hole pairs are separated spatially by an 
internal electrical field created by introducing special 
impurities into the semiconductor. 
 This separation creates negative charges on one side 
of the interface and positive charges on the other 
side, generating a voltage and direct current (DC) 
when connected to a load.  
 Photovoltaic cells are interconnected to form PV 
modules with a power capacity of up to several 
hundred watts. Photovoltaic modules are then 
combined to form PV systems.  
 The unit watt-peak is often used to express the costs 
or efficiency of Solar PV because the output of a PV 
cells varies according to solar irradiance and ambient 
temperature. 
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2.3 Investment-risk curve for photovoltaic technologies 
The various photovoltaic technologies are at different stages of maturity, from laboratory experiments 
to commercial systems. First Solar will supply solar modules with the Cadmium Telluride (CdTe) thin-
film technology to Solentejo. 
Source: SBC Energy Institute. “Solar Photovoltaic Factbook,” September, 2013. 
2.4 Market comparison between crystalline silicon and thin-films technologies (2013) 
 Thin-film Crystalline silicon 
Efficiency 4 – 17%* 14 – 20% 
Average module price per watt peak  $0.85 $1.1 
Market share 10-15% 85-90% 
* Cadmium Telluride (CdTe) thin-film solar cells can reach efficiencies of up to 16.7%. 
Source: Adapted from SBC Energy Institute. “Solar Photovoltaic Factbook,” September, 2013. 
2.5 Thin-film proven performance advantage over crystalline silicon solar modules 
At temperatures above 25°C, First Solar modules 
produce more energy than competing solar modules 
due to a superior temperature coefficient. 
This proven performance advantage provides 
stronger plant performance in high temperature 
climates, where more than 90% of a plant’s 
generation will occur when module temperatures are 
above 25°C – giving First Solar modules a proven 
performance advantage. 
As a result of First Solar’s superior performance in 
high temperature and high humidity climates, First 
Solar power plants produce up to 8% more annual 
energy than competing power plants with the same 
nameplate capacity, improving bankable returns for 
our customers and partners. 
 
Source: First Solar. http://www.firstsolar.com/Home/Technologies-and-Capabilities/PV-Modules/First-Solar-
Series-3-Black-Module (accessed May 20, 2015).  
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2.6 PV manufactures league tables of 2011 and 2012 
Source: SBC Energy Institute. “Solar Photovoltaic Factbook,” September, 2013. 
Exhibit 3: Financials of Sun Ventures 
  
Source: Sun Ventures records. 
Exhibit 4: Types of services proposed by Banco Lusitano Group 
Banco Lusitano de 
Investimento 
(Advisory services) 
 Analysis of technical aspects (together with technical advisors) 
 Analysis of regulatory and legislative aspects (together with lawyers) 
 Development of the contractual assumptions for risk allocation 
 Preparation of the business plan, the financial model and the assumption scenarios 
for performing sensitivity analysis 
 Determination of the financing needs  
 Identification of sources and forms of debt and equity capital 
 Organization and negotiation of the financing terms, including project security, 
external support and guarantees 
Banco Lusitano 
(Lending services) 
 Arranging, structuring and underwriting bank financing 
 Granting pool financing (lending),  marketing the transaction to other lenders and 
attracting participations  
 Agency services, maintaining documentation, monitoring use of funds by the 
borrower and holding the bank accounts of the project company and acting as single 
point of contact, or “controlling creditor” 
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Exhibit 5: Distribution of the renewable energy sources from 2005 to 2013, as well as a decreasing 
external dependence. 
 
Distribution of the renewable sources 
in the total amount of energy consumed (ktoe) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Gross final consumption of 
energy (GFCE) 
19,400 19,127 19,298 18,877 18,645 18,583 17,768 16,627 16,334 
Distribution of renewable 
energy sources (RES) 
3,792 3,979 4,233 4,332 4,554 4,492 4,371 4,098 4,198 
     Electricity 1,252 1,350 1,499 1,598 1,742 1,955 2,144 2,174 2,238 
     Heating and cooling sectors 2,529 2,546 2,602 2,600 2,595 2,218 2,210 1,905 1,936 
     Transport sector 11 83 131 134 218 319 17 18 25 
 % of RES in GFCE 19.5% 20.8% 21.9% 22.9% 24.4% 24.2% 24.6% 24.6% 25.7% 
Source: DGEG. February 2015 Renováveis – Estatísticas Rápidas. http://www.dgeg.pt/ (accessed May 16, 2015) 
 
Exhibit 6: Comparison of tariffs for wind onshore and solar PV (average to maximum remuneration) in 
the EU-27 in 2011 with their long-term marginal generation costs (minimum to average costs). 
 
Figure 1: Wind onshore 
 
Figure 2: Solar PV 
Source: ECOFYS, and Fraunhofer ISI. 2011. “RE-Shaping: Shaping an effective and efficient European 
renewable energy market”, October 1, 2011, 34 – 46.  
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Exhibit 7: Levelized cost of energy (LCOE) by technology in Euros per MWh in 2014 in Portugal. 
The LCOE represents the per-MW hour cost (in real euros) of building and operating a power plant over 
an assumed financial life and duty cycle. 
 
Source: EDP Renewables. “Offshore wind development,” October, 2014. 
Exhibit 8: Comparison of the average wholesale base-load electricity prices (Eur/kWh) in the first half 
of 2014.  
 



















Eur/MWh in 2014 
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Exhibit 9: The evolution of the Portuguese renewable installed capacity (MW) from 2006 to 2014. 
 
Installed capacity in MW 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Hydro 4,848 4,853 4,857 4,884 4,898 5,332 5,539 5,535 5,566 
> 30 MW 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,234 4,666 4,877 4,877 4,908 
≤ 30 MW 614 619 623 651 664 667 662 658 658 
Wind 1,699 2,464 3,058 3,564 3,914 4,378 4,531 4,731 4,953 
Biomass 335 348 350 408 592 575 564 564 564 
Photovoltaic 3 15 62 110 134 175 244 299 421 
Others* 123 130 131 139 149 165 177 182 190 
Total Renewable 7,008 1,809 8,458 9,106 9,687 10,626 11,054 11,311 11,694 
* Includes Municipal Solid Waste, Biogas and geothermal energy. 
Source: DGEG. February 2015 Renováveis – Estatísticas Rápidas. http://www.dgeg.pt/ (accessed May 16, 2015) 
 
Exhibit 10: The evolution of the Portuguese renewable annual production (GWh) from 2006 to 2014. 
 
 
Total electricity production in GWh 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Hydro 11,467 10,449 7,298 9,009 16,547 12,114 6,660 14,868 16,455 
> 30MW 9,884 9,405 6,281 7,648 14,454 10,615 5,683 12,931 14,223 
≤ 30MW 1,582 1,044 1,017 1,361 2,093 1,499 977 1,937 2,232 
Wind 2,926 4,036 5,757 7,577 9,182 9,162 10,260 12,015 12,099 
Biomass 1,380 1,549 1,500 1,713 2,226 2,467 2,496 2,516 2,487 
Photovoltaic 5 24 41 160 215 282 393 479 639 
Others* 410 534 543 556 585 667 600 732 723 
Total Renewable 16,188 16,593 15,140 19,016 28,754 24,692 20,410 30,610 32,400 
Gross Production 
+Net Importation 
53,934 54,319 54,901 54,259 56,316 54,697 53,470 53,310 53,224 
% of renewables 30.0% 30.5% 27.6% 35.0% 51.1% 45.1% 38.2% 57.4% 60.8% 
* Includes Municipal Solid Waste, Biogas and geothermal energy. 
Source: DGEG. February 2015 Renováveis – Estatísticas Rápidas. http://www.dgeg.pt/ (accessed May 16, 2015) 
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Exhibit 11: Comparison of the installed capacity (MW) and annual production (GWh) per renewable 
technology for 2010 (DGEG’s historical data) and 2020 (NREAP’s estimative). 
  
2010 DGEG 2020 NREAP 
Potência (MW) Energia (GWh) Potência (MW) Energia (GWh) 
Hydro 4,898 16,547 9,548 14,073 
Wind 3,914 9,182 6,875 14,596 
Onshore 3,914 9,182 6,800 14,416 
Offshore - - 75 180 
Biomass 592 2,226 952 3,516 
Photovoltaic 134 215 1,000 1,475 
Geothermal 29 197 75 488 
Waves - - 250 437 
Total 9,567 28,367 18,700 34,585 
Sources: 
 DGEG. February 2015 Renováveis – Estatísticas Rápidas. http://www.dgeg.pt/ (accessed May 16, 2015). 
 NREAP. March 2011. “Portugal 2020: National Reform Programme,” approved by the Council of Ministers 
20 March 2011, Chapter 5 - Sustainable Growth. 
 
Exhibit 12: Portugal’s net energy trade balance as percentage of GDP. 
Data sources: 
 Banco de Portugal, Annual National Accounts. 





















Energy trade deficit % of GDP
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Exhibit 13: Global Project Finance Market by source of funding from 2005 to 2013. 
Source: Canuto, Otaviano. 2014. “Liquidity Glut, Infrastructure Finance Drought and Development Banks.” 
The World Post, Chart 2. 
Exhibit 14: Euro-area banking system reported tier 1 ratios from the first half of 2010 to 2013. 
Source: Canuto, Otaviano. 2014. “Liquidity Glut, Infrastructure Finance Drought and Development Banks.” 
The World Post, Chart 3. 
Exhibit 15: Euribor 12 month rate on last day of each year, from 2005 to 2014. 








2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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Exhibit 16: Asset Financing new investment in renewable energy by type of security, from 2004 to 
2014, $BN. 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance. “Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2015,” figure 33. 
Exhibit 17: Asset Financing new investment in renewable energy by region, from 2004 to 2014, $BN. 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance. “Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2015,” figure 34. 
Exhibit 18: Asset Financing new investment in renewable energy by sector, from 2004 to 2014, $BN. 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance. “Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2015,” figure 35. 
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Financing the Alentejo Solar Power Plant (B-1): Bank’s confidential for Carlos 
After carefully assessing the Solentejo’s feasibility, Carlos Abrantes looked over a standard term sheet 
for financing a solar photovoltaic (PV) renewable energy project. He would have to fill in several items, 
including the loan characteristics – amount, maturity, interest rate, repayment schedule – as well as its 
structural features - financial ratios, fee structure, and cash sweep mechanism. Besides all these items, 
the template’s boilerplate provisions were based on the current norms for a solar PV financing, so Carlos 
believed those should be accepted by the client Ana Luz. Those provisions included: 
 ‘Cash flow waterfall’ provision: operating expenses and taxes are top payment priority, followed 
by interests, hedging costs, and principal repayment. These are followed by set asides in the 
reserve accounts, a possible cash sweep of senior debt, and lastly distribution to shareholders; 
 Debt Service Reserve Account (DSRA): this shall have sufficient funds to cover the following 
debt service explicit on the corresponding term loan repayment; 
 Conditions for distributions to shareholders: the Debt Service Cover Ratio (DSCR) must be 
higher than the minimum set in the Finance Contract, which determines the debt structure, and 
the DSRA must be fully funded; 
 Default ratios: default if either DSCR < 1.05x or LLCR < 1.10x; 
 Grace period: this shall not surpass the construction period of the solar power plant; 
 Basic contract provisions: such as representations, conditions precedent, covenants and events 
of default, accordingly to the actual requirements for similar projects. 
Carlos’s main concerns were then focused on pinpointing the remaining loan terms that would satisfy 
both Banco Lusitano’s credit committee and Sun Ventures’s shareholders. Although Carlos did not 
know the exact requirements of Sun Ventures shareholders regarding, for instance, their IRR, he knew 
how to design a project finance deal in accordance to the BLI's structuring policies for the Portuguese 
PV sector. The features upon which Carlos based his decisions to structure the Solentejo’s project loan 
are as follows: 
 Facility amount: this should correspond to a maximum debt-to-equity ratio of 75:25 (in the 
Sources and Uses of Funds) and should satisfy a minimum level of the DSCR of 1.25x under a 
P50 scenario and 1.15x for a P90 scenario, assuming a reasonable panel degradation; 
 Maturity: this shall not surpass the maturity date of the guaranteed feed-in tariff period, leaving 
a “tail period” between the end of the loan contract and the end of the sales contract. As a 
benchmark, a longer tail period provides lenders with a higher safety margin; 
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 Interest rate: Euribor36 plus the Margin. The interest margin can either be fixed or variable37 for 
the entire term of the loan repayment period and shall lie between 200 bps38 and 360 bps; 
 Repayment profile: repaid on an annual amortizing basis, starting 12 months from the first day 
of the operating period. The repayment plan shall be in accordance with the Final Maturity and 
should be structured in accordance with the debt sizing criteria above mentioned; 
 Success fee39: it should range from 1.50 % to 2.50 % on the facility amount; 
 Administrative fee40: it should be fixed at an annual price ranging from Eur 50,000-75,000; 
 Cash sweep mechanism: 40% to 80% of the excess cash flow after debt service shall be used to 
prepay the facility throughout its maturity. 
Concurrently, Carlos considered the previously assessed risk profile of Solentejo in making his 
decisions. Having reviewed the loan structure, Carlos wondered about which of the proposed terms 
would be more likely to cause an unenthusiastic reaction from Ana during the course of the negotiation. 
As such, Carlos assessed which of the loan conditions could be softened as well as which counter-offers 
he would be willing to consider in order to achieve a proper alignment of interests and fair risk/returns 
between Sun Ventures and BLI. The recent deals of BLI for the PV sector in Portugal have ranged 
between EUR 1.4-1.7 million per MW financed. 
As he entered figures into the term sheet template, Carlos kept wondering if he would face competition 
from other banks for this deal. When he asked Ana whether she was talking to other banks, she had 
replied cryptically, “We are seeking the best funding option”. In fact, there had been a fierce competition 
among banks to lend to established-technology solar energy projects. 
 
                                                     
36 Euribor is the average rate at which selected Eurozone banks lend money in the interbank market. 
37 The variable margin can be linked either to time or to the level of DSCR ratios for each year. As regards to the margin-time 
relationship, the most common solution is to provide for an increasing margin after the grace period. As far as margin-cover 
ratios are concerned, in certain projects, interest is established based on the level reached by DSCR coefficients: the higher the 
coefficients, the lower the spreads applied to the base rate, and vice-versa. 
38 The 200 bps is the minimum all-in spread required by Banco Lusitano given its current cost of long-term funding and cost 
of capital for project finance loans in the PV sector in Portugal. 
39 The success fee is paid once the planning mandate has led to a successful conclusion. The level of the success fee will be 
inversely proportional to the size of the project. 
40 The administrative fee charged is to cover expenses related to record keeping and administering a credit agreement. 
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Financing the Alentejo Solar Power Plant (B-2): Sponsor’s confidential for Ana 
As she prepared to negotiate with Banco Lusitano de Investimento (BLI), Ana Luz – responsible for 
arranging the project financing to be acceptable to shareholders – reflected upon the advantages and 
drawbacks of the two proposal loan term sheets that she already had in hand. Over the past several 
weeks, Ana had held meetings with three banks besides BLI, and two of them had presented final term 
sheets. Carlos was not exactly aware of these offers; when he had asked Ana whether she was talking to 
other banks, Ana had responded as cryptically as she could, “We are seeking the best funding option”. 
Ana reviewed the term sheets that she had received from Banco Agricola Português (BAP) and 
International China Bank (ICB) as depicted in Exhibit 1. The term sheets were nearly identical with 
respect to several provisions, which according to Sun Ventures’s attorney were consistent with the 
current standards for solar PV financing, and were also expected to be included in BLI proposal. These 
standards include: 
 ‘Cash flow waterfall’ provision: operating expenses and taxes are the top payment priority, 
followed by interests, hedging costs, and principal repayment. These are followed by set asides 
in the reserve accounts, a possible cash sweep of senior debt, and lastly distribution to 
shareholders; 
 Debt Service Reserve Account (DSRA): this shall have sufficient funds to cover the following 
debt service explicit on the corresponding term loan repayment; 
 Conditions for distributions to shareholders: the Debt Service Cover Ratio (DSCR) must be 
higher than the minimum set in the Finance Contract, which determines the debt sizing, and the 
DSRA must be fully funded; 
 Default ratios: default if either DSCR < 1.05x or LLCR < 1.10x; 
 Grace period: this shall not surpass the construction period of the solar power plant; 
 Basic contract provisions: such as representations, conditions precedent, covenants and events 
of default, accordingly with the actual requirements for similar projects. 
Besides that, on the one hand, the ICB’s term sheet implied to bring in a “Chinese flavor”, i.e., a Chinese 
PV equipment manufacturer. Although Ana was open to that possibility, she wondered whether this new 
Chinese partner could offer a lower equipment price for the same terms and conditions already set under 
BuildSun's long-standing partnership with First Solar. On the other hand, the BAP’s proposal imposed 
some constraints on the payment of development fees as part of Solentejo’s funding needs. Ana 
suspected that it could be related with the fact that both the EPC and O&M partners were sister 
companies, since they were subcontracted within the same group as Sun Ventures – Green Partners 
Group.  
In the meanwhile, Ana asked her attorney for advice on how to approach the upcoming negotiation with 
BLI, in light of the two offers she had in hand. His reply was as follows: 
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You need to find a balance between Green Partners’s and the banks’ interests. Try to put 
yourself in their shoes and think about which conditions you would like to have satisfied. For 
instance, from the sponsors’ perspective, what is the minimum leverage and debt tenor you 
would be willing to accept? And what about the maximum annual debt service and fee 
structure? From the banks’ standpoint, in which contractual terms would make you feel more 
comfortable to finance this initiative? At the end of the day, it all depends on the subjective 
perception about the relevance of a given project risk in influencing the values of operating 
cash flows. I don’t have the required financial expertise to assess the economic convenience 
for each party, however, I think that these two offers serve as a good basis for the upcoming 
negotiation with BLI as well as for the alignment of interests within Green Partners Group. 
Ana had negotiated hard with both BAP and ICB and did not believe that she could further improve 
their terms. Frankly, Ana was not sure of which of the two proposals she would choose if she was not 
able to negotiate better arrangements with BLI. As a last resort, Ana had always the option of selling 
the 20 MW power generation license. 
Exhibit 1: Analysis of Term Sheets from BAP and ICB. 
 Banco Agrícola Português International Chinese Bank 
Facility                                                                        
Amount 
 D/E = 65:35; 
 Min DSCR = 1.25x (P50 scenario); 
 Min DSCR = 1.10x (P90 scenario); 
 Maturity 11 years; 
 Facility amount = Eur 30.5M. 
 D/E = 75:25; 
 Min DSCR = 1.20x (P50 scenario); 
 Min DSCR = 1.10x (P90 scenario); 
 Maturity 13 years; 
 Facility amount = Eur 36 M. 
Facilities 
Margins 
Euribor + Margin. 
Margins: 
 250 bps until (and including) the 5th year after 
Financial Close; 
 350 bps from the 6th until the Final Maturity. 
Euribor + Margin 
Margins under a P50 scenario: 
 200 bps if: DSCR > 1.40; 
 250 bps if: 1.30x ≤ DSCR ≤ 1.40x; 
 300 bps if: 1.20x ≤ DSCR < 1.30x. 
Margins under a P90 scenario: 
 200 bps if: DSCR > 1.30; 
 250 bps if: 1.20x ≤ DSCR ≤ 1.30x; 
 300 bps if: 1.10x ≤ DSCR < 1.20x. 
Fees 
 
 Success = 1,5% (on the Loan Facility); 
 Administrative = Eur 50,000 per year. 
 Success = 2,5% (on the Loan Facility); 
 Administrative = Eur 65,000 per year. 
Cash Sweep 
Mechanism 
80% of the excess cash flow after debt service 
shall be used to prepay the facility throughout 
its maturity. 
40% of the excess cash flow after debt 
service shall be used to prepay the facility 
throughout its maturity. 
Other Key 
provisions 
 Requires a “Chinese flavour”. 
Additional 
notes 
 The Portuguese BAP was in 2013 the best 
investment bank according to the Portuguese 
League Table. 
 BAP had participated with Sun Ventures in the 
financing of those 2 solar farms which were 
later sold in 2011. 
 Recently, BAP has been rumored for not being 
‘hands-on’ and offering an inappropriate 
project monitoring. 
 ICB is a well positioned bank in China, 
however, it has no previous experience in 
the Portuguese renewable energy sector. 
 ICB has on course an internationalization 
strategy through a set of business 
acquisitions and financing of potential 
targets in Europe. 
Source: Sun Ventures records.
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Financing the Alentejo Solar Power Plant 
Teaching Note 
Synopsis 
The case opens with Ana Luz, project manager at Sun Ventures, a renewable energy company focused 
on the development of solar powered projects, preparing to receive a loan proposal from Carlos 
Abrantes, head of project finance at Banco Lusitano de Investimento, a Portuguese Investment Bank, 
for funding the Solentejo project - fictional solar power plant located in Alentejo Region of Portugal. 
Ana has made all the efforts to bring this solar project to life, and is now seeking debt to finance the 
Solentejo’s development and construction costs. 
The case describes the main phases of the usual process of developing a solar power plant in Portugal, 
portraying the background of Sun Ventures and Banco Lusitano de Investimento as a typical solar 
developer and investment bank, respectively. The context of the Portuguese green economy is 
introduced, including the renewable energy program – expected targets and reforms for the renewable 
energy sector underlying the Europe Strategy 2020 to reduce the dependence on net imports of fossil 
energy – and energy regulatory issues around the setting of feed-in tariffs, by the Governments, to 
promote the generation of electricity from renewable energy sources. Along with this, the case provides 
a brief overview of the global project finance market as well as some figures on the financing of the 
renewable energy sector. In closing, the general guidelines for assessing the credit worthiness and 
bankability of a project financing proposal in the renewable energy sector are outlined. 
The teaching plan is structured around an exercise – completed before class – in which pairs of students 
assume the roles of Ana Luz and Carlos Abrantes, respectively, in order to negotiate a loan term sheet. 
Note that roles are assigned in the accompanying (B) cases in which students should first read the 
respective (B) case and then prepare a proposal to negotiate terms and conditions of the loan. 
Intended audience and learning objectives 
This case is aimed at graduate students taking an advanced finance course, either in project or corporate 
finance. Some of the possible learning objectives are: 
 Building an understanding of how the project financing structure and debt sizing are modelled. 
 Identifying the project risks and returns to the various parties and discussing its credit worthiness 
for a financing proposal. 
 Exploring tradeoffs confronting sponsors with the typical terms and conditions for project financing 
presented by the banks. 
 Reinforcing comprehension of project finance logic, which results from triangulation between: 1) 
financial leverage required to meet shareholders’ IRR target; 2) minimum level of financial 
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performance ratios acceptable to the lenders – depending on their risk perception about the project; 
3) lenders’ remuneration in terms of fees and margins; and 4) market norms / conditions (e.g., 
regulatory, political and legal environment as well as banks’ “long-term funding appetite”). 
 Considering negotiation strategies in a situation where: i) both parties view leverage as a crucial 
outcome, but have some room for negotiating around other issues perceived as more important by 
one party than the other (e.g., cash sweep); ii) the lender lacks knowledge about the shareholder’s 
BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement); and iii) the sponsor seeks to lower funding 
costs and lengthen tenor while the lender seeks adequate net loan pricing, shorter tenors  hand tight 
credit risk monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
 Highlighting the importance of project finance to the development of renewable energy 
technologies, a topic of current interest in many countries which are addressing environmental and 
energy security concerns. 
Negotiation Exercise 
This negotiation exercise is designed to take place before the case discussion in class. A suggested 
guideline, consisting of 3 phases, is hereby presented. 
Phase 1 - Setting up working groups 
Depending on the class size, the instructor forms groups of 2 to 4 people at most, attempting to have the 
same number of Bank Groups and Sponsor Groups. The negotiation exercise involves two randomly 
assigned pairs, with one pair assuming the Carlos Abrantes role (the Bank Group) and the other Ana 
Luz’s (the Sponsor Group). For each assigned role, the instructor will then send the respective case 
supplement (B), containing confidential information for Carlos and Ana, respectively. 
Phase 2 – Setting target outcomes 
Before the two sides meet to negotiate, students will work on the financial model attached to this case 
to try to maximize their respective payoff. Students who belong to the Sponsor Groups will try to identify 
their optimal solution, as will the other students playing the role of the Banks, accordingly with the 
confidential guidelines each group has from their respective (B) case41. 
Within the deadline determined by the instructor, both Groups will complete and submit a poll (to be 
seen by their instructor only, not by their respective counter-parties) disclosing their target outcomes – 
aspirational but plausible - for the upcoming negotiation. The Bank Groups will complete a poll that 
                                                     
41 The financial model attached with the case allows students to test scenarios by changing a large number of variables on the 
Debt Structuring sheet. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that some industrial variables (e.g. operating revenue) must not 
be modified during the negotiation exercise because any adjustment to these numbers has to be corroborated through technical 
due diligence, a process which has not yet been carried out at this initial stage. Furthermore, the instructor should encourage 
students to focus their attention only on the Summary and Debt Structuring sheets in the model, to prevent them from spending 
too much time analyzing the other spreadsheets and relative formulae in each, since it would simply distract them from the real 
objective of this case study. 
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specifies the target outcomes for their loan proposal: 1) leverage; 2) tenor of the facility; 3) margin; 4) 
fees charged; 5) cash sweep; 6) any other provisions. The Sponsor Groups, besides setting their target 
outcomes for those 6 items to be covered in Banks’s proposal, also have to specify another item: 7) which 
of the three options (described in the “Sponsor’s confidential” B-2 case) they will pursue – Banco 
Agrícola Português, International Chinese Bank, or selling the license – if they cannot reach an 
acceptable deal with Banco Lusitano de Investimento. 
 Phase 3 - Negotiation 
This phase starts with the Bank Groups sending an email to their counter-party (copying the instructor) 
in which they indicate their position on the 5 items to be covered in their loan proposal42. Then, the 
groups will meet to negotiate. Once finished, the Sponsor Groups will have to complete another poll 
presenting the outcome of the negotiation: deal or no deal, and if a deal, which agreement was reached 
with respect to the same negotiating issues. All of these procedures should be completed before a 
specified deadline set by the instructor before the discussion class. 
Suggested instructions for students and poll questions are provided in an Appendix to this teaching note. 
Roadmap for discussing in class 
A suggested 80-minute teaching plan has 6 sections, structured as follows: 
10 Minutes 1. Summary and debrief of outcomes of negotiations between each Sponsor-Bank pair 
15 Minutes 2. Assessment of bargaining situation 
20 Minutes 
3. Discussion of project risks and project feasibility and bankability from Sponsor’s 
and the Bank’s specific perspective  
20 Minutes 4. Discussion and analysis of individual financial terms and conditions 
10 Minutes 5. Reflections on bargaining strategies and tactics 
5 Minutes 6. Concluding remarks: Summarizing key lessons learned through this case 
1. Summary and debrief of outcomes between each Sponsor-Bank pair 
Start by sharing a few summary statistics for the class, for example: i) percentage of groups that did not 
reach an agreement with Banco Lusitano de Investimento; ii) average loan amount for those who did 
reach agreement; iii) the higher and lower sponsor’s IRRs. Debrief a few groups – for example, a 'no 
deal’ outcome, a high sponsor IRR, and a low loan amount – asking each side, “What happened?”. When 
the “agreed price” varies widely among the negotiation pairs, the instructor might also ask, “Are you 
sure you were all buying and selling the ‘same car’?”. 
2. Assessment bargaining situation 
The following suggested questions aim to contextualize the case for class discussion. 
                                                     
42 Notice that the terms and conditions of these items does not necessarily have to be the same as the ones 
previously set. 
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Who are the main project Parties and the key project contracts? 
Students are asked to prepare a diagram of the project contracts in order to better understand the 
contractual structure and to present it in a visual form (as in Figure 1), taking special care to distinguish 
the different roles of the various contractual parties with similar names, as is typical in project finance. 
Alternatively, the instructor may distribute the diagram at the beginning of the assignment to facilitate 
the analysis.  
Figure 1: Contractual Diagram for Solentejo’s project. 
Why is project finance adequate for solar power initiatives? 
Project finance is the typical scheme employed to finance capital-intensive projects – such as solar 
power plants. Although sunlight is free, generating electricity by capturing the sun’s rays requires high 
up-front capital costs during the solar plant installation that might be either difficult to be financed on-
balance sheet of the sponsor or too costly when financed on their own. However, it is important to stress 
out that project finance lenders never want to be the first to finance an untested technology, meaning 
that solar power initiatives need to have an established-technology in order to be eligible for project 
financing. 
How does the current project financing landscape look like for banks? 
The banking sector has been undergoing regulatory changes aimed at tackling riskier banking activities 
and to prevent a repeat of the bankruptcies and bail-outs of 2008. Basel III, for instance, requires banks 
to hold more equity and capital for long-term loans, increasing the cost of long-term funding and 
therefore limiting credit availability and increasing the pricing of long-term debt. Along with the bank 
rating downgrades and Eurozone instability, the underlying cost to banks of lending has been further 
increased, especially long-term, due to the uncertainty perceived in the banking sector. However, with 
the downward movement in Euribor swap rates that have outweighed those increases in margins, the 
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long-term project finance has still been available and affordable. Looking ahead, nobody knows how 
long Euribor will remain low and when it will increase. However, one thing is sure: with Basel III fully 
implemented by 2019 it is likely that there will be further impacts on the costs of bank funding from this 
legislation over the next few years and therefore additional increases in loan margins and reduced 
availability of long-term bank debt. 
How aggressively does Banco Lusitano de Investimento want to bid for Solentejo’s project? Why? What 
do they want in the future? 
A couple of reasons may lead Banco Lusitano de Investimento to be rather aggressive when bidding for 
Solentejo’s project. First and foremost, this initiative could be their first deal with Sun Ventures and 
therefore mark the beginning of a long term relationship which is fundamental within the renewable 
energy sector. Second, when looking ahead, one should also take into consideration the large potential 
for solar development in the upcoming years – expected to increase from 421 MW in 2014 to 1,000 MW 
by 2020, according to the target set by the Portuguese NREAP – which might lead Banco Lusitano to 
establish additional partnerships with Sun Ventures. Notice that the energy policy underlying the Europe 
Strategy 2020 gives the renewable industry a fair ‘business case certainty’, essential to attract further 
investment and financing in this sector. Therefore, given the current context of the Portuguese economy, 
it is unlikely that Banco Lusitano and other banks will have better financing opportunities in Portugal 
than the existing ones in the renewable energy sector, at least in the short-term. Third, the financing 
required for the Solentejo project is in accordance with the recent deals of Banco Lusitano for the PV 
sector in Portugal, which have ranged between Eur 1.4-1.7 million per MW financed.  Last but not least, 
although closing a deal is always a plus for any bank's reputation, in this case, it would also strengthen 
the prominence of Banco Lusitano in the Portuguese solar energy sector. 
What criteria should Ana use to select the bank besides the quantitative figures such as loan pricing? 
The other factors that Ana should focus on when selecting a bank are the following: i) the experience 
from previous or current partnerships; ii) the organization’s reputation; iii) the know-how in the 
renewable energy sector, especially in solar; and not least important iv) experience in financing projects 
in Portugal. Additionally, if possible, Ana should take into consideration the bank’s contract monitoring 
expertise, albeit subjective and difficult to assess when there is no experience from previous transactions, 
it is fundamental to know the bank’s experience in handling project stresses and coordinating inter-
creditor decision making as well as the timely approval of drawdown requests, waivers, consents and 
amendments. 
3. Discuss project’s risks and feasibility from the Sponsors’ and Banks’ specific perspectives. 
Prior to negotiating the loan proposal, both the Bank Groups and Sponsor Groups should devote some 
time analyzing all the possible risks Solentejo project could bear during its economic life. The life cycle 
of solar projects involve long-term investments with a clear-cut separation between the construction 
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phase, when the project is not yet able to generate cash, and the operational phase. These phases have 
very distinct risk profiles and impact the future outcome of this initiative in different ways. The 
following Table 1 summarizes the strategies that Ana Luz took to mitigate some of the risks that could 
arise during the life cycle of the Solentejo project. 
Risk Mitigation strategy Allocation to 
Construction Phase 
Non completion Performance bond. 
BuildSun Completion with cost overruns Fixed price EPC contract. 
Delayed completion Penalties per week of delay, liquidity damages. 
Completion with performance 
deficiency 
Warranty of PR for the first 2 years after 
commissioning, liquidity damages. 
BuildSun / First Solar 
Licensing Construction’s permit from the Alentejo Municipality. Sun Ventures 
Operation Phase 
Panel underperformance Panel warranty. First Solar / BuildSun  
Market (Revenue) Power Purchase Agreement. EDP 
Operating O&M contract. 
BuildSun Ventures O&M contractor underperform Penalties to compensate the profit losses. 
O&M cost increase Fixed O&M contract. 
Licensing 
 Land promissory contract up to 30 years; 
 Production License from DGEG; 
 Grid Reception point from EDP. 
Sun Ventures 
Table 1: Classification of some project’s as well as the strategies for their allocation. 
However, the Bank Groups, when assessing the credit worthiness of Solentejo, might have a different 
view regarding those mitigation strategies and might even raise other concerns that were not addressed 
by Ana yet. Indeed, the financial terms and conditions proposed by the Bank Groups will certainly 
depend on their perception about the risk profile of the project, as will the expectations about the 
Sponsor's IRR. The following Table 2 summarizes some of the concerns that are most likely to become 
the center of discussion in the negotiation as well as the possible arguments raised by each party to ease 





Ana Luz Carlos Abrantes 
Capacity 
and strength 





 “BuildSun mastered the required expertise to 
build solar plants”; 
 “Qualified team with 10 years-experience”; 
 Turn-key contract under fixed-time, fixed-
price and guarantees; 
 The group formed by Sun Ventures and 
BuildSun provides an integrated business 
model designed to offer competitive solutions 
in the various stages of solar energy projects: 
from prospection, licensing and development 
to the construction and operation phases. 
 BuildSun is a Sun Venture’s 
sister company; 
 Potential for conflicts of interest; 
 To what extent are the EPC 
contract penalties and guarantees 
reasonable and reliable? What if 
Green Partners Group defaults? 
 Are construction and 
commissioning risks really 










 BuildSun and Sun Ventures, through their 
joint venture, took on the O&M risk as one of 
their areas of expertise: 
 Sun Ventures has an operating portfolio of 
10 MW; 
 “BuildSun mastered the required expertise 
to operate solar plants”; 
 BuildSun Ventures is an affiliate 
of Sun Ventures (65%); 
 Potential for conflicts of interest; 
 Is operating risk really 
transferred to an unrelated third 
party? What if Green Partners 
Group defaults? 
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 Full O&M contract under fixed-time, fixed-
price and guarantees; 




 –  
First Solar 
 
 “Proven technology with over 10 GW 
installed worldwide”; 
 Among the top-10 module manufactures; 
 Thin-film solar modules have proven a 
performance advantage over conventional 
crystalline silicon solar panels in high 
temperature climates; 
 Additionally, provides a 20-year warranty on 
the performance of its modules; 
 Publicly traded in NASDAQ Stock Exchange. 
 According to the investment-risk 
curve, thin-film is a riskier 
technology than Crystalline 









 Commitment to the project: 
 Eur 14.2 million as equity; 
 Obtained the required licenses to start 
construction and operation of the solar 
plant; 
 The time invested in developing. 
 Renewable energy company focused on the 
development of solar powered projects; 
 14 MW of power installed in the Iberian 
Peninsula. 
 Financially dependent from 
Green Partners Group; 
 Lack of experience in 
developing solar projects with 










 Political commitment to renewable energy 
promotion shown by the NREAP underlying 
the Europe Strategy 2020; 
 Electricity production gives priority of 
dispatch to renewable energy sources over 
conventional fossil fuel sources; 
 Electricity market is regulated by ERSE. 
 Due to the existent tariff deficit, 








 Volume-based and variable duration FiT; 
 The current project’s FiT does not seem to 
overpay when comparing with the levelized 
cost of energy for the solar PV. As such, it is 
more likely to have the older awarded FiTs 
renegotiated first (in 2011 the average 
remuneration was 300 Eur/MWh); 
 EDP has a stable outlook and a low risk 
profile (S&P: BB+; Moody’s: Baa3; Fitch: 
BBB-). 
 Although the corresponding 
costs with the PPA are borne by 
EDP, it is the Portuguese 
Government who determines the 
value of the feed-in tariff paid to 






 Euribor swap rates have been falling. 
 Increased cost of the long-term 
funding; 
 Banking regulatory changes. 
Solar 
irradiation   
 The solar tracker system allows generating 
more energy than fixed mounting systems. 
 Site specific data would be 
preferable, since the solar data 
available (DNI) corresponds to 
the average of the 1994-2010 
period for the Alentejo region. 
Legend 
Low concern        Medium concern        High concern 
Table 2: Summary of some possible concerns as well as arguments that might be raised by Ana and Carlos. 
Recall that creditors lend money for the development of an initiative solely based on its specific risks 
and future cash flows. As such, if there are risks that have not been anticipated or properly hedged, the 
ability of the project to repay costs, debt service, and dividends to shareholders can be potentially 
jeopardized. 
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4. Discussion and analysis of individual financial terms and conditions 
How will the Bank Groups reflect their risk valuation in their financial proposal? Discuss the financial 
terms that are more likely to impact the bank’s DSCR and sponsor’s IRR. 
After having assessed the Solentejo's risks, the Bank Groups must start by defining the debt and equity 
mix to use to finance the structure. Notice that banks lend money depending on the difference between 
the cash flow and the amount of the debt service – that is the DSCR. Therefore, the more risk-averse the 
lenders are, the more they would insist on a higher minimum level of DSCR required for this initiative 
in order to provide them with a safety margin against unexpected circumstances that could shrink the 
project’s cash flows available for debt service. As such, if the proposed financial structure is too 
aggressive with respect to the level of project risk, the Bank Groups can ask for an increase in the pricing 
of the financing (e.g. margin, success fee, or administrative fee) and/or a greater equity contribution 
from the Sponsor Groups. Although banks have to protect the bankability of the deal as well as to try to 
increase their remuneration in terms of fees and margins, their financing proposal also has to allow for 
adequate project leverage and remuneration to shareholders, such that a deal might be achieved between 
both parties. 
The loan repayment profile also reflects the perceived project risk. The greater the risk is, the lower the 
loan tenor proposed will be, since banks would insist on a higher tail, and/or the higher the cash sweep 
mechanism to ensure that the loan is repaid before the end of the guaranteed stream of revenues. Notice 
that the repayment profile is critical given that DSCR is a direct function of the period over which the 
loan is amortized. The shorter this period is, the higher the annual debt service will be and the more 
likely it is that DSCR will be below the minimum level set by the bank. If this happens, the bank is 
likely to offer a smaller amount of debt and/or more demanding contract terms. From the sponsor’s point 
of view, it is important to bear in mind that they will benefit from longer loan tenors as well as lower 
DSCR and cash sweep covenants, aiming for early cash distributions to increase their equity IRR. 
When assessing the risk of the loan repayment profile, the Bank Groups might also take into account 
the average life of the loan – that is, how long, in average yearly terms, it takes for the loan to be repaid 
by its contractual debt service, which includes interest, capital, fees and cash sweep. As such, depending 
on how the loan repayments are determined, it could be possible to have the same loan with different 
average term to maturity simply by structuring it with higher early repayments or with a cash sweep. 





, where n is the total number of repayments, 
t is the time corresponding to the repayment, DSt is the debt service in time t, and L is the loan amount. 
The following Table 3 shows some alternative scenarios for the expected level of DSCR, loan’s average 
life and sponsor’s IRR by combining likely financial structures for Solentejo’s project with different 
loan repayment profiles. In accordance to Banco Lusitano’s structuring policies, these are based on a 
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P50 scenario, a grace period of 1 year, a fixed margin of 280 bps, a success fee of 2.0% and an annual 


















      
Eur 30.5 M 
D/E = 65:35 
Min. DSCR 1.29x 1.29x 1.43x 1.43x 
Avg. DSCR 1.33x 1.34x 1.63x 1.61x 
Loan avg. life 6.11 5.58 6.44 5.58 
Equity IRR  8.47% 8.23% 8.64% 8.26% 
      
Eur 36 M 
D/E = 75:25 
Min. DSCR 1.11x* 1.11x* 1.25x 1.25x 
Avg. DSCR 1.12x 1.13x 1.45x 1.37x 
Loan avg. life 6.50 6.24 6.90 6.25 
Equity IRR 9.20% 9.28% 9.96% 9.51% 
      
Eur 33.3 M 
D/E = 70:30 
Min. DSCR 1.19x* 1.20x* 1.33x 1.33x 
Avg. DSCR 1.21x 1.23x 1.46x 1.55x 
Loan avg. life 6.31 5.92 6.68 5.92 
Equity IRR 8.40% 8.67% 9.29% 8.84% 
*Recall that the loan proposal should satisfy a minimum DSCR of 1.25x under a P50 scenario.  
Table 3: Examples of some financial scenarios. 
Which variables should be considered to test the robustness of Solentejo? 
Having established a base case, both the Bank Groups and Sponsor Groups should assess the robustness 
of Solentejo to adverse changes in the key parameters that can influence operating cash flows, IRR and 
cover ratios. One method largely considered by banks is to verify how much each parameter needs to 
change until the minimum project's DSCR equals 1 (the break-even point). As a result, if the variation 
needed to trigger a project default – that is a DSCR lower than 1 – is so extreme that it becomes very 
unlikely, the project would prove sufficiently robustness in the face of events that could give rise to such 
changes. Although it is theoretically possible to generate an infinite number of scenarios, one must also 
limit this number to a manageable level. In what concerns solar projects, the reduction on the PPA sales 
tariff and its combination with an extension of the loan tenor are the parameters usually tested. As an 
example, the following Table 4 tests the robustness of the Solentejo concerning those 2 parameters 
under a capital structure of 70:30 and a 13 years loan tenor with a cash sweep of 40% (one of the 
scenarios presented in Table 3): 
 
Base Case 
Worst case scenarios 
PPA tariff 
Combining the reduction on the PPA tariff with the 
maximum extension of the loan maturity 
Reduction (%) - -27% -36% 
Maturity (years) 13 13 15 
Min. DSCR 1.33x 1.00x 1.00x 
Avg. DSCR 1.46x 1.07x 1.06x 
Loan avg. life 6.68 7.57 8.39 
Project IRR 7.42% 4.68% 3.86% 
Equity IRR 9.29% 4.31% 2.90% 
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis results. 
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Discuss the 3 options available for Ana: i) Banco Agrícola Português; ii) International Chinese Bank; 
iii) Selling the license.43 
The following Table 5 summarizes some of the pros and cons that students might argue after comparing 
the financial proposal of Banco Agrícola Português with the one of International Chinese Bank. 
 Banco Agrícola Português International Chinese Bank 
Pros 
 Lower fee structure; 
 Experience from two previous 
financing partnerships. 
 ICB’s terms matched the required funding and offered 
a substantially better financing conditions: 
 Higher leverage; 
 Longer tenor; 
 Lower cash sweep; 
 Margin is linked to the project performance; 
 Higher equity IRR for Sun Ventures’s shareholders. 
Cons 
 Rumors for not being ‘hands-
on’; 
 Limits the payment of 
development fees as part of 
funding needs. 
 
 No previous experience in the Portuguese renewable 
energy sector; 
 Green Partners Group might not accept the Chinese 
alternative due to the following concerns: 
 Unlikely to reach better financial conditions than 
the ones agreed with BuildSun (their subsidiary); 
 The long-established partnership with First Solar; 
 First Solar is also well-positioned among the top-
10 PV module manufacturers. 
Table 5: Comparison of the BAP and ICB financial proposals. 
Regarding the option of selling the generation license, although the Case Study does not mention if there 
are any interested bidders, the license has an expected market price based on its PPA and the LCOE for 
the solar PV sector in 2014. Starting with the difference between the current feed-in tariff of 
148 Eur/MWh and the LCOE of 104 Eur/MWh (according to Exhibit 7), the expected market price is 
44 Eur/MWh. However, in order for it to be comparable with the value of the previous license, one 
needs to multiply this expected market price per MWh by the maximum amount of energy subsidized 
(also in MWh) allowable through the PPA. As a result, knowing that the PPA grants the feed-in tariff to 
the first 440,000 MWh delivered to the electrical grid (22,000 MWh per each installed MW), one might 
conclude that a fair price of the license in market terms as of 2014 would be Eur 19.36 M. Therefore, if 
Ana were able to sell the license at that price in 2014, Sun Venture’s shareholders would get a return of 
16.76% over a 2-year time horizon (recall that the license was purchased in 2012 by Eur 14.20 M). 
Nonetheless, it is important to stress out that this return can be either higher or lower depending on the 




                                                     
43 For class discussion, the instructor can show the summary term sheets of Banco Agrícola Português and International Chinese 
Bank (given in the “Sponsor’s confidential” B-2 case) and get a few groups on the sponsor’s side comment on how they thought 
about these proposals. Notice that the Bank Groups might be unaware of these offers. 
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5. Reflections on bargaining tactics 
The Instructor might use the following to question students what they learnt from the simulation 
negotiation exercise: 
 Which bargaining tactics were used by the Sponsor Groups? And the Bank Groups? 
 When, if ever, would it make sense for the Sponsor Groups to disclose the existence of their 
offers from Banco Agrícola Português and International Chinese Bank? 
 In a negotiation like this, would “hard-ball” tactics – for example, intransigent refusal to modify 
positions – ever make sense? 
In the renewable energy as well as in the infrastructure sector in general, sponsors have to work with 
banks for a long time under long term financing contracts – there is no separation without compensation 
– so chemistry matters, as does setting the right tone for the relationship during early negotiations. 
Assignment Questions 
1) Prepare a diagram of the project, the main project Parties and the key project contracts. 
2) Why is project finance adequate for solar power initiatives? 
3) How does the current project financing landscape look like for banks? 
4) How aggressively does Banco Lusitano de Investimento want to bid for Solentejo’s project? 
Why? What do they want from this project in the future? 
5) What criteria should Ana use to select a bank besides the quantitative figures such as loan 
pricing? 
6) Please discuss project’s risks and feasibility from the Sponsor’s and Bank’s specific 
perspectives. 
a. What are the risks associated with Solentejo? 
b. Have the risks been adequately managed and mitigated? 
c. What arguments can Ana use to overcome the top concerns of the Banks? 
d. What are Carlos top concerns and how could he overcome them? 
7) Define and justify your base case scenario underlying your proposal as well as its robustness. 
8) (Only for the sponsor Groups) If no agreement is reached with Banco Lusitano, what do you 
think would be your best option? The BAP financial proposal? The ICB’s? Or would it be better 
to consider selling the license?  
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Poll: Target outcomes for the Bank Groups 
Before you begin bargaining, and before sending an email proposal to your Sponsor Group counterparty, 
please complete the following poll specifying your target outcomes for the negotiation. Your responses 
do not need to reflect your opening positions; they should represent realistic outcomes that you hope to 
achieve after bargaining. Note that this poll will be seen by your instructor only, not by your 
counterparty. 
1. How much leverage are you proposing? Maximum facility amount? Minimum DSCR? 
2. Maximum tenor of the facility? 
3. Minimum Margin? 
4. Minimum fees charged? 
5. Minimum cash sweep? 
6. Other provisions beyond the ones previously stated? If yes, please specify any other terms that 
you are targeting. 
Poll: Target outcomes for the Sponsor Groups 
Before you read the email with proposed terms sent by your Bank Group counterparty, please complete 
the following poll specifying your target outcomes for the negotiation. Your responses do not need to 
reflect your opening positions; they should represent realistic outcomes that you hope to achieve after 
bargaining. Note that this poll will be seen by your instructor only, not by your counterparty. 
1. What is the minimum equity IRR are you targeting?  
2. How much leverage are you targeting? Minimum facility amount? Maximum DSCR? 
3. Minimum tenor of the facility? 
4. Maximum margin? 
5. Maximum fees charged? 
6. Maximum cash sweep? 
7. Other provisions beyond the ones previously stated? If yes, please specify any other terms that 
you are targeting. 
8. If you cannot reach an agreement with Banco Lusitano de Investimento, which financing 
proposal will you select? A = Banco Agrícola Português , B = International Chinese Bank, C = 
Sell the license. 
  
Financing the Alentejo Solar Plant - Additional Appendix 
2 
 
Poll: Negotiation outcomes 
Please send only one poll response per team; the Bank Group side does not need to complete this poll. 
1. Did you reach an agreement on the financing by Banco Lusitano de Investimento? If “no”, you 
can ignore all questions that follow. (A = yes, B = no) 
2. How much leverage did you agree upon? Maximum facility amount? Minimum DSCR? 
3. Tenor of the facility? 
4. Margin? 
5. Fees charged? 
6. Cash sweep? 
7. Please specify any other terms that you agreed upon. 
 
  




The instructor may distribute the following glossary with the assignment to facilitate the comprehension 
and analysis of the Case Study. 
Affiliate 
A foreign operation either a branch or foreign incorporated subsidiary. A corporation 
that directly (or indirectly) controls or is controlled by another corporation. 
Agency 
Agreement 
A legal agreement between a borrower, a group of lenders, and one or more agent 
banks governing the rights and responsibilities of the agent(s) in the transaction. The 
agency agreement is an integral part of a syndicated loan. 
Agent The bank responsible for administering a project financing. 
All-In Rate The interest rate including the loan spread, commitment fees, and other up-front fees. 
Amortization 
Reduction of capital or up–front expenses (capitalized) over time, often with an equal 
amount per annum. 
Arranger 
A bank or other financial institution responsible for originating and syndicating a loan 
transaction. 
Availability Period The period during which a loan is available for drawdown. 
Available Cash 
Flow 
Total cash sources less total cash uses before payment of debt service. 
Average Loan Life The average maturity for all repayments weighted by the principal outstanding 
Bankable Capable of being financed. 
Base Case A cash flow projection with variables measured at their expected values. 
Base Load Plant 
A power plant that runs all the time, as opposed to a plant that is used only in times of 
peak electricity requirements (a peaking plant). 
Base Rate 
On a variable rate loan, it is the key underlying rate to which lenders add a spread to 
come up with a total lending rate for the borrower. 
Basel Accord 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervison’s regulatory framework of capital 
standards for banks, established in 1988 to protect bank owners, depositors, creditors, 
and deposit insurers (e.g., Governments) against financial distress. 
Basis Point One-hundredth of one percent (1/100 * 1%, or 0.0001). 
Break Even 
The reduction of a project finance net cash flow to zero by changing an input variable 
such as the output price or input costs. 
Capacity 





Long-term expenditures for property, plant, and equipment. 
Completion 
The date on which the project's cash flows become the primary method of repayment. 
It occurs after commissioning. 
Completion 
Guarantee 
A guarantee that ensures a project will achieve physical and/or financial completion. A 
turnkey contractor guarantees physical completion (achievement of certain operating 
performance). The guarantees are normally secured by performance bonds and/or 
penalties in the form of liquidated damages. Alternatively, project sponsors sometimes 
provide lenders with completion guarantees by agreeing to pay the scheduled debt 
service in the event the project company does not or cannot pay. 
Commissioning 
A test of the project’s ability to perform as planned and generates the expected cash 
flows. In a limited-recourse deal, it is the time when the project moves from a full 
recourse to a nonrecourse financing. 





A set of preconditions that must be satisfied before the borrower can request drawdown 
or other credit facilities be made available under a lending agreement. 
Covenant 
An agreement by a borrower to undertake (a positive covenant) or not to undertake (a 
negative covenant) a specific action. Breaching a covenant is considered an event of 
default. 
Creditworthy The risk of default on a debt obligation by that entity is considered low. 
Current Account 
Balance 
The current account shows flows of goods, services, primary and secondary income 
between residents and non-residents. 
Cushion The extra amount of net cash flow remaining after expected debt service. 
Debt The obligation to repay an agreed amount of money. 
Debt Capacity 
The total amount of debt a company can prudently support given its earnings 
expectations, equity base, and asset liquidation value. 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio (D:E Ratio) 
A ratio of a company’s debt to its total capitalization.  The higher this ratio the greater 
the financial leverage of the company. 
Debt Service 
Principal repayments plus interest and fees payable; usually expressed as the annual 




A quantitative measure used by lenders to determine whether a project’s prospective 
net cash flow from operations can support (make timely service payment on) a given 
amount of debt at the indicated potentially available terms. For any given debt service 
period, the debt service coverage ratio is defined as the cash available for debt service 




A reserve account set up to ensure the timely payment of principal and interest. 
Default 
When a covenant has been broken or an adverse event has occurred. A monetary 
default occurs when a repayment is not made on time. A technical default occurs when 
a project parameter is outside defined or agreed-upon limits, or a legal matter is not yet 
resolved. 
Dispatch 
The schedule of production for all the generating units on a power system, generally 
varying from moment to moment to match the production with power requirements. As 
a verb, to dispatch means to direct the plant to produce power. 
Due Diligence 
Bank lenders to a project will undertake a thorough assessment of the transaction 
which covers financial, legal, technical, and insurance aspects of the project in order to 
ensure that there are no undisclosed or potential problems. 
Equity 
In a project financing, the cash or assets contributed by the sponsors.  In accounting, 
the difference between total assets and total liabilities. 
Event of Default 
Any event that entitles the lender to cancel a debt facility, declare all amounts owed by 
the debtor to become immediately due and payable, and/or enforce security. 
Fee 




A renewable energy policy that typically offers a guarantee of: i) payments to project 
owners for total kWh of renewable electricity produced, ii) access to the grid; and iii) 
stable, long-term contracts. 
Financial Close 
The date on which all project contracts and financing documentation are signed and 
conditions precedent to initial drawing of the debt have been satisfied or waived. 
Financial Viability 
The ability of a project to provide acceptable returns to equity holders and to service 
its debt on time and in full. 





The documents which provide the project financing and sponsor support for the project 
as defined by the project contracts. 
Force Majeure 
An excuse for contractual nonperformance due to events beyond the control of either 
party. These events are either “acts of God” (floods, fires, or other natural disasters) or 
political risks (war, strikes, riots, expropriation, breach of contract, etc.). Contractual 
performance is forgiven or extended by the period of force majeure. 
Full Recourse 
No matter what risk event occurs, the borrower agrees to repay the debt. By definition, 
this is not a project financing unless the borrower's sole asset is the project. 
Funding Risk 
The impact on project cash flow from higher funding costs or lack of availability of 
funds. 
Gearing A measure of leverage such as the ratio of debt to equity or debt to total capitalization. 
Grace Period 
The period within which a default is resolved without incurring penalty interest or 
other charges.  A period during which interest or principal is not yet payable; it usually 
occurs after startup, commissioning, and completion in a project financing. 
Greenfield 
Refers to a project being conceived and executed where no project company, assets, or 
operations exist. A greenfield site or project location is one where no infrastructure 
exists to support the project. 
Independent 
Engineer (IE) 
A consulting firm that helps lenders by evaluating the technical aspects of a project 
(e.g., completion schedule, technical feasibility, etc.). 
Indicative Terms 
The likely commercial terms upon which a bank will lend, subject to its internal credit 
approval or other conditions. It is not a firm offer to lend or arrange a loan. 
Information 
Memorandum 
A document that describes the project and the financing details; it is issued in 
connection with a loan syndication. 
Interest Rate 
The percentage payable to the lender calculated at an annual rate on the principal 
amount outstanding on a loan. 
Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) 
The discount rate that makes the net present value equal to zero. Multiple IRRs occur 
mathematically if the periodic cash flows change signs more than once. 
Joint Venture A business venture owned by two or more other business ventures. 
League Tables 
A ranking of lenders and advisors according to the underwriting, final take, or number 
of project finance loans or advisory mandates completed during a given period. 
Letter of Credit 
(LC) 
A financial instrument issued by a financial institution for the benefit of a customer 
under which the financial institution agrees to pay money to the beneficiary thereof 
upon demand or upon the occurrence of specified event. 
Leverage The level of debt expressed as a percentage of equity or as a ratio to equity. 
Limited Recourse 
Under certain conditions (related to legal, financial, or operating conditions), lenders 
have access to the sponsors' credit or other legal security to fulfill a project’s debt 
obligations. There is usually recourse in the event of fraud, misrepresentation, or 
nondisclosure. For this reason, and because lenders often have some kind of recourse 
prior to completion, nonrecourse is often described as “limited-recourse” financing. 
Liquidated 
Damages (LDs) 
Specific and limited amounts that a contracting party is required to pay to another 
contracting party in the event an agreed-upon area of performance is not achieved. 
Load Factor A utilities average demand as a percentage of peak demand. 
Loan 
Amortization 
The scheduled repayment of loan principal. A loan amortization schedule specifies the 
amounts of principal to be repaid and the dates on which repayments are to be made. 
Loan Life Cover 
Ratio (LLCR) 
The net present value of cash available for debt service (CADS) from the calculation 
date to the final maturity of the debt facilities divided by the principal outstanding on 
the calculation date. 




The bank given the authority to proceed into the marketplace on behalf of the 
borrower, on the basis of the terms and condition set out in the mandate letter. The 
mandated bank is often referred to as the arranger in the Euromarkets and the 
administrative agent in the United States. 
Margin 
The amount expressed as a percent per annum above the interest rate basis or cost of 
funds. 
Maturity The final date a project finance loan is repayable. 
Mezzanine Debt 
Refers to a type of debt which is between senior debt and equity.  The cost of 
mezzanine debt is greater than senior debt as there is more risk involved. 
Negative 
Covenants 
Promises by the borrower in a loan agreement to abstain from undertaking certain 
actions. 
Nonrecourse 
The lenders rely on the project's cash flows and security over the project vehicle's 





A contract obligating a party to operate and maintain a project. 
Positive Covenants Promises made under a loan agreement by the borrower to undertake certain actions. 
Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA) 
A contract for a large customer to buy electricity from a power plant. This is usually 
the most important contract underlying the construction and operation of a power plant. 
Principal The quantity of the outstanding project financing due to be paid. 
Project Company A special-purpose vehicle created to develop, own, and operate a project. 
Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV) 
An entity established for a particular purpose, such as obtaining off-balance sheet 




Analysis of how changing an input variable in a financial model affects the value, 
performance, or solvency of a given project. 
Shareholders 
Agreement 
The generic term for any contract between two or more shareholders governing their 
conduct in relation to the corporation, or partnership, in which they own shares. 
Stand-by equity 
A standby commitment involving a specific amount of money callable by lenders for 
the purpose of covering cost overruns until completion. 
Tenor The number of years a loan is outstanding (i.e., the final maturity or term). 
Term Sheet 
A document that outlines in general terms the key agreements to be contained in a legal 
document; other terms loosely associated and often used interchangeably are a letter of 
understanding (LOU) and a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
Turnkey Contract 
A construction contract that provides for the complete engineering, procurement, 
construction, and start-up of a facility by a certain date, for a fixed price and at 
guaranteed performance levels. 
Warranty A guarantee that a given fact will exist at some future date, as promised. 
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